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Abstract
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution
on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three
parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about
the level of public-good provision and beneﬁt from perks when in oﬃce. A
government raises taxes for both purposes. We show that tax contracts yield
moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand
coalitions in order to win government. Moreover, in polarized societies they
unambigously improve the welfare of the median voter.
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1 Introduction
The ﬁscal commons problem represents one of the most prominent explanations of
excessive spending in democracies. The original reasoning by Buchanan and Tullock
(1962) and Weingast et al. (1981) runs as follows: The government budget represents
a common pool for political decision-makers. A larger number of decision-makers on
the public budget is called higher fragmentation of government. Higher fragmentation
tends to increase government spending. The reason for this is that political decision-
makers are concerned with targeting resources from the public budget to projects that
beneﬁt their supporting interest groups. Through the tax scheme, the costs of these
special expenditure programs are spread over the whole population. Hence, a politician
in the government and the interest group he represents fully appropriate the beneﬁts of
their targeted project, while only bearing a fraction of 1/m of the costs, where m stands
for the appointed decision-makers representing particular constituencies. Accordingly,
the higher the number of appointed decision-makers (the higher the fragmentation of
government), the smaller is the share of internalized project costs, thus increasing the
government budget, government size, and socially wasteful spending.
In this paper we propose the ﬁscal institution tax contracts as a remedy for the ﬁscal
commons problem. This novel institution works as follows: During campaigns parties
can make promises in the form of limitations on tax rates that they want to honor when
in power. For example, one party may promise not to increase tax rates, while another
party may specify a range of value-added taxes. Such tax promises are approved by a
public certiﬁcation body and are called tax contracts. If a party becomes part of the
government at the end of the term of oﬃce, the certiﬁcation body evaluates whether
the tax promise has been kept by the government. As tax rates are veriﬁable, a simple
yes/no decision is possible when the contract is up for review. If yes, there are no further
consequences. If the tax promise has been violated, the party is heavily punished. For
instance, its public funding will be cut or, even more extremely, the party will lose its
2right to nominate candidates for the next election. We assume that such punishments
are so severe that tax contracts will never be violated. Hence tax contracts enable a
party to commit to a range of tax rates during campaigns.
We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government.
Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision, and they ben-
eﬁt from perks when in oﬃce. A government raises taxes for both purposes. One party
is an extremist party, while the others are conventional parties. They either form the
government as a single party, if one of them receives a majority of seats, or they form
a grand coalition. The observation that grand coalitions are likelier in the presence of
an extremist party is a common attribute of democracies with proportional representa-
tion. Recent examples include elections in Germany, 2005, Austria, 2008, 2006, 1995,
1990, 1986, Turkey, 1999, and Hungary, 1994.1
The model produces three insights. First, tax contracts yield moderate policy plat-
forms. The reason is as follows: With tax contracts, parties will commit to tax rates
close to the ones preferred by the median voter. When parties are in power, they
do not have an incentive to choose extreme levels of public good provision (high or
low), as they balance their own perks and beneﬁts from public goods. Thus moder-
ate policy outcomes emerge during legislative periods. However, as parties will always
choose some perks when they are in power, the policy outcome will diﬀer from the one
preferred by the median voter.
Second, tax contracts lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coali-
tions. The reason is that, without tax contracts, voters on one side of the political
spectrum have little incentive to vote strategically for the party on the other side of
the political spectrum. Such strategic voting would indeed yield the beneﬁt of avoiding
the formation of a grand coalition, which is associated with higher perks. However,
this comes at the cost of having a party in government that would choose taxes and
public good provision that are very unattractive to voters on the other side of the
political spectrum. If societies are polarized, with tax contracts, strategic voting and
thus avoidance of grand coalitions becomes attractive, as a governing party will not
deviate from the tax promise and will choose moderate public good provision. This
implies smaller utility losses for voters on the other side of the political spectrum than
the utility gains from having lower perks for the government.
1Source: Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
3Third, tax contracts tend to improve the welfare of the median voter. This is due to
the moderating eﬀect of tax contracts with respect to policy. By contrast, without tax
contracts there may be extremely high or low levels of public good provision plus –
according to the intuition in the previous paragraph – a low incentive to avoid large
amounts of perks associated with grand coalitions. There is one exception: very low
levels of polarization, i.e. where the ideal points of parties are very close. Public
good provision is reduced with tax contracts, whereas without tax contracts taxes are
increased. As increasing taxes is less expensive in terms of utility losses than reducing
public good provision, the regime without tax contracts may be favorable in societies
with very little polarization.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section relates our paper to the litera-
ture. In Section 3 we develop the model. Section 4 examines the formation of coalition
governments without contracts. In Section 5, we introduce tax contracts into the leg-
islative game and characterize the equilibria. The eﬀects of tax contracts are identiﬁed
in Section 6. In Section 7 we examine how tax contracts aﬀect the welfare of the me-
dian voter, and in Section 8 we discuss possible extensions of our model. Section 9
concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
One of the most prominent explanations for excessive spending in democracies is the
ﬁscal commons problem caused by fragmented governments. Several causes for frag-
mented governments have been put forward in the literature. Buchanan and Tullock
(1962) and Weingast et al. (1981) have derived the ﬁscal commons problem from ge-
ographical fragmentation, as representatives at the federal level represent electoral
districts. Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Roubini et al. (1989) have focused on coalition
size as an indicator of fragmentation. Further interpretations of fragmented govern-
ment refer to the number of spending ministers and cabinet size (Schaltegger and Feld,
2009). Recent theoretical examinations of a dynamic version of the ﬁscal commons
problem can be found in Battaglini and Coate (2008).
There exists a large body of empirical literature on how more fragmented governments
aﬀect the size of the government and policy outcomes like unemployment and inﬂation.
This literature is surveyed in Schaltegger and Feld (2009), who themselves ﬁnd that
the number of ministers in Swiss cantons is associated with large government sizes.
4They also indicate that ﬁscal referenda tend to alleviate the ﬁscal commons problem.
A variety of institutional provisions exist that might help to remedy the ﬁscal commons
problem. Feld and Kirchg¨ assner (2001) and Feld and Matsusaka (2003) indicate that
ﬁscal referenda help to restrain overspending by governments. Poterba and von Hagen
(1999) provide a detailed account of how formal ﬁscal rules aﬀect ﬁscal performance,
while Persson and Tabellini (2003) relate constitutional rules shaping a particular type
of democracy to economic outcomes, including government spending. Tax contracts
are a new type of institution that may help to tame the ﬁscal commons problem and
foster welfare.2
Our paper is broadly related to the issue whether political competition will reduce
or eliminate the rents of competing political parties. This literature indicates that
competition reduces rents, either because there is uncertainty regarding the preferences
of parties (Polo, 1998) or because coordination of voting on non-corrupt parties in
democracies with proportional representation is diﬃcult to achieve (Myerson, 1993).
In our model, all parties will choose some rents when they are in government, as they
cannot commit to renouncing perks altogether. However, tax contracts can reduce
these rents.
3 The Model
3.1 Voters and policies
We consider a representative democracy with an electorate that consists of a set of
voters, I. Voters are identiﬁed by their income level yi, i ∈ I. The density function
f(y) over the interval [ymin,ymax] describes the income distribution. The median voter’s
income level is denoted by ym.





Voters elect a parliament, which in its turn elects a government. The activities of the
government are:
2A companion paper (Gersbach and Schneider, 2008) examines the impact of tax contracts on
government formation in a four-party system.
5• choosing the level of a public good g ∈ [0,∞) and the perks for the parties in
power. Perks comprise targeting expenditures that are welfare-reducing but ben-
eﬁt interest groups and the constituency supporting politicians in power. Perks
also include all government expenditures that beneﬁt politicians in power directly,
such as administrative empires or prestige projects.3 Both the public good and
the perks are ﬁnanced by a linear income tax with tax rate t. We assume that
taxation is distortionary. Let λ > 0 denote the shadow cost of public funds.
Accordingly, taxation uses (1 + λ) of taxpayer resources in order to levy 1 unit
of resources for public projects and for perks. The costs of providing the amount
g of the public good is gc, where c > 0 is the unit cost.
• choosing a binary policy d ∈ {0, ¯ d}, ¯ d > 0, where d = 0 represents the status quo.
The binary policy ¯ d describes large changes, such as waging a war, international
agreements on arms control or trade, implementing large-scale regulatory reforms,
etc.
The utility of a voter with income yi is given by
Ui = U(yi,δi) = Alng + (1 − t)yi − δid,
where δi ∈ {−1,1}. We assume that the characteristic δ = −1 is distributed identically
to income over the electorate. Ex ante, this could also be interpreted as every citizen
possessing the same probability of being in favor of the extreme policy change.
Before we introduce parties, it is useful to look at voters. Suppose a government (single
party or coalition of parties) is elected with sk seats in parliament. As voters cannot
prevent the government from choosing perks, the desired policy and ﬁnancing scheme




s.t. tY = (1 + λ)(gc + skb),
where b denotes the ﬁxed amount of perks per governmental parliamentary member.







3An extreme form of perks is the overly generous possibility of using public money for private
expenditures. The examples revealed in Great Britain in 2009 show how far such attempts can go.



















i = 0. (3)
Equations (1) and (2) reveal that voters with higher incomes prefer lower tax rates and
lower levels of public good provision.
3.2 Parties
The total number of seats in the parliament is given by S. There are two conventional
parties denoted by j,k = {L,R} with platforms (yL,1) and (yR,1) competing for seats
in the parliament. Accordingly, party L (R) is the left (right) party. We refer to parties
as ‘conventional’ if their platform involves δ = 1.
We assume that yL < ym < yR. The utility of a party k is given by
Vk = U(yk,0) + 2θsk
√
b,
where θ is a weighting factor and b are the perks in oﬃce per member of party k if
party k is part of the government. The variable sk denotes the number of party k’s
parliamentary seats. The utility formulation of Vk implies decreasing marginal utility
with respect to gk. Further, Vk has the property that the ﬁrst unit of gk possesses
inﬁnite marginal utility, which induces parties to choose positive levels of public goods.
If it is the sole party in power, i.e. if sk secures a legislative majority, then the party’s




s.t. tY = (1 + λ)(gc + skb)


















k = 0. (6)
7Comparing (5) with (2), we ﬁnd that the optimal policy of parties with regard to
the public good corresponds to the preferred policy of the respective voter with the
characteristic (yk,1). The tax rate, however, is higher than voter yk’s preferred tax
rate (which would be
A
yk) as the party ﬁnances perks for its members.
Finally, there is a protest or extreme party E with platform (yE,−1) and utility4
VE = U(yE,−1) + 2θsE
 
bE.
According to the preferences of its constituency, the extreme party would like to im-
plement ¯ d. Throughout the paper we assume that policy ¯ d is suﬃciently important in
the sense that a voter with δi = −1 is better oﬀ with the optimal choice of party E
than with any choice of the conventional parties that involves dk = 0.
3.3 Rules and information
We consider a parliamentary democracy with proportional seat allocation, i.e. the
parliamentary seats are distributed among the parties according to their vote shares.
In order to obtain seats in parliament, parties need a certain share of votes denoted by
z (z > 0).
The informational environment is as follows:
• At the beginning of the political race and when parties sign the tax contracts, it
is common knowledge among all voters and the parties that
– with probability p the platform of party E will ﬁnd a response from voters,
thereby generating a share of
sE
S votes in favor of ¯ d over d = 0. This share
is suﬃcient to enter parliament (
sE
S ≥ z).
– with probability 1−p the platform of party E will not attract suﬃcient votes
for party E to enter parliament.5
• Before the election takes place, voters observe their characteristic δ, which will
remain private information. Voters have the same information as before regarding
the likelihood that E or ¬E will occur.
4The particular value of yE is not important for our analysis. As the voters of the extreme party
are distributed identically as income, the median income in the set of voters supporting the extreme
party is ym.
5The size of the vote share of the extreme party does not matter, as the number of seats for the
conventional parties depends only on their relative vote shares.
8We refer to the event of the extreme party entering parliament as event E. The opposite








This upper bound on the seats simpliﬁes the analysis and justiﬁes calling party E an
exteme party. The extreme party can however be quite large, for example a 25% share
of seats is allowed.
3.4 The political process
The political process involves three main stages:
Stage 1: Tax contracts
Stage 2: Election
Stage 3: Government formation
In the ﬁrst stage we allow parties to sign tax contracts. A tax contract of a party con-
tains a range of tax rates that this party voluntarily commits to during the campaign.
The tax contract becomes eﬀective if the party is part of the coalition that forms the
government. We assume that there are suﬃciently severe sanctions if a party violates
the tax contract when in government such that violation will never occur. Such sanc-
tions might be severe ﬁnes or drastic reduction or elimination of public ﬁnancing for
such a party.
In the second stage the election takes place, followed by the formation of the government
in stage 3. We proceed as follows: In the next section we examine the political process
in the absence of tax contracts. This case not only captures what occurs in present-day
practice in representative democracies, it also serves as a benchmark for the scenario
with tax contracts. If no tax contracts are allowed, only stages 2 and 3 occur. In stage
3 either a single party is able to form the government or two parties j and k form
a coalition. We assume that coalitions are formed only by the conventional parties,
i.e. party E is excluded from the government formation process. This is justiﬁed
by the indivisibility of the policy option d and the role of ideology as a constraint
9on bargaining by parties, which is a prominent theme and an important argument in
the political economy literature (see Mueller (2003), Benabou (2008)). The deﬁning
characteristic of party E is policy d = ¯ d. Hence for ideological reasons a compromise
in this political dimension is not possible for the extreme party. The following stages
ensue if j and k form a coalition:
Stage 3.1: Parties maximize
σkVk + σjVj
over (t,g,d = 0) subject to the budget constraint
tY = (1 + λ)(gc + (sj + sk)b),
where σk =
sk
sk+sj represents the share of seats of party k within the
coalition.
Stage 3.2: Vote of conﬁdence. The proposed government coalition is elected if it
receives a majority of votes in parliament. If the vote of conﬁdence
fails, a “caretaker government” assumes power, which will implement
policy vector (g,t,(bj)j∈{L,R,E},d) = (tctY
1+λ,tct,0,0).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the two conventional parties are symmetric,
i.e. the median voter is indiﬀerent between the most desired policy/ﬁnancing scheme
of parties L and R if both parties receive half the seats.6
4 Election and Government Formation without Tax
Contracts
4.1 Government formation
We ﬁrst outline the detailed game for government formation. Recall that our major
assumption is that only conventional parties can form a government. If a conventional
party has a majority of votes, it forms the government and implements its desired
policy and ﬁnancing scheme. If no conventional party has a majority of seats, they











that the platforms of the parties have to satisfy ln(
yR
yL) = ym( 1
yL − 1
yR).
10bargain and maximize a weighted sum of their utilities.
In the following we characterize the outcome with a coalition government consisting of
the two conventional parties.
Lemma 1
Suppose that both conventional parties form a coalition government. Then the ﬁnanc-















The proof follows directly from solving the maximization problem described in Stage
3.1 of the government formation process.
4.2 Election
In the next step we examine the decision of the voters and the associated political
outcome. We assume that voters with δi = −1 vote in favor of party E.7
As we have a continuum of voters, an individual voter has no inﬂuence on the outcome
and any voting outcome may be supported as a Nash equilibrium. Accordingly, we
use the following selection criteria: A combination of voting strategies, policy, and
ﬁnancing decisions by the party or coalition in power is called an equilibrium if
(i) it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(ii) there is no subset of conventional voters that can do better by changing their
voting behavior.
Essentially, we are looking for subgame-perfect equilibria with coalition-proof voting.
If there are multiple equilibria, we will invoke a further reﬁnement and require that in
any equilibrium the set of citizens who vote strategically be minimal.8
7Sincere voting for the extreme party can also be justiﬁed by ideological considerations, see Benabou
(2008).
8The justiﬁcation is that coordination of voting e.g. through interest groups is costly and diﬃcult
to achieve if the set is large relative to the electorate. If there are multiple equilibria, they are
qualitatively equivalent in the sense that government formation is the same across parties.
11Voting strategies are denoted by µi ∈ {L,R,E}. If the entire constituency votes
sincerely, there will be a single-party government of either L or R with probability
1
2 if
the extreme party does not enter parliament. If E enters, only a grand coalition of L
and R will be possible.
A grand coalition in event E can be avoided if a suﬃciently large subset of the electorate
votes strategically. Let the minimal sets of strategic voters preventing a grand coalition
in the case of party E entering parliament be [ˆ yR,ym] and [ym, ˆ yL], where ˆ yR < ym and
ˆ yL > ym. The income levels of the critical voters ˆ yL and ˆ yR are deﬁned by














The notation means that the critical voter ˆ yk will vote for party k when voting strate-
gically but will prefer party j when voting sincerely.
There are three types of voting outcomes that can be induced by strategic voting.
(1) A subset of voters of measure |[ym, ˆ yk]| (k = L or R) deviates from sincere vot-
ing, thereby allowing party k to form a single-party government with a minimal
majority in event E and with a supermajority comprising S2
2(S−sE) seats in event
¬E.
(2) A subset of voters greater than |[ym, ˆ yk]| deviates from sincere voting. This
enables party k to build a single-party government with supermajorities in both
events E and ¬E. In this case, the number of seats for party k will exceed S
2 in
event E and S2
2(S−sE) in event ¬E.
(3) A subset of voters smaller than |[ym, ˆ yk]| deviates from sincere voting. This
implies that in event E a grand coalition will still come about, albeit with a
policy tilted towards party k’s ideal policy. In event ¬E, party k will form a
single-party government with a supermajority of seats.
Note that in general there are several possible coalitions of voters for establishing
a certain voting outcome, e.g. achieving a single-party government with a minimal
majority of seats in event E. We focus on strategic voting by voters with incomes
closest to the median income. The reason is as follows:
12Suppose an arbitrary subset of voters that would vote for R when voting sincerely
switches to party L. This implies that L will form a single-party government in ¬E.
In event E either a grand coalition will be established, where L has larger bargaining
power than R, or a single-party government of L will materialize. Due to the singled-
peaked preferences, the closer a voter’s income is to the median income, the less he
will suﬀer from this policy shift toward L. Hence, if no subset of voters closest to the
median has an incentive to deviate from sincere voting, then no subset of voters farther
away from the median will have such an incentive either.
The next lemma rationalizes why there may be strategic voting.
Lemma 2




The proof follows simply from showing that S−sE > S2




which is given according to Assumption 1.
A detailed analysis of the incentives for strategic voting is given in Appendix A. Here we
provide a brief summary. Before we start, note that we do not consider strategic voting
for the extreme party in order to reduce perks. There are various possible justiﬁcations.
For instance, there could be ethical reluctance on the part of conventional voters to
vote for extremists. Another reason may be associated with trembles. If by error some
small subset of voters additionally votes for E, then this party may come to power and
implement an extreme policy change, which is extremely undesirable for conventional
voters.
We start our summary by examining the conditions under which deviation (1) may be
proﬁtable. As a grand coalition occupies more seats in the legislature than a single-
party government, it is associated with higher perks. A subset of voters may thus
consider deviating from sincere voting to avoid a grand coalition in case the extreme
party becomes part of the legislature. The minimal set of strategic voters needed to
avoid a grand coalition is such that in event E a single-party government will occupy
a minimal majority of seats in the legislature. To be willing to deviate from sincere
voting, this set of voters has to accept a single-party government formed by the less-
preferred party in both events – whether E enters the legislature or not – in exchange
for lower perks.
For example, suppose that subset [ym, ˆ yL] of the electorate votes strategically for party
13L. With probability p, the extreme party will enter parliament and party L will form
a single-party government with a minimal majority of seats
S
2. Without the deviation
from sincere voting, a grand coalition had been formed with S − sE seats. Hence the
perks associated with
S
2 −sE seats can be avoided with the help of the strategic voters.
However, from the perspective of those who consider voting strategically, the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of lower perks comes at the price of a policy tilted toward their less-preferred
party rather than the moderate policy of a grand coalition. Moreover, if the extreme
party cannot enter the legislature, party L will deﬁnitely form the single government
with a supermajority of S2
2(S−sE) seats. With sincere voting, the strategic voters, who
actually prefer party R, would have a chance of 1
2 that their preferred party forms the
government in event ¬E. Also with sincere voting, there would be minimal majorities
for the single-party governments. Hence, we can say that from the perspective of
those who consider voting strategically, the only beneﬁt is lower perks in event E from
avoiding a grand coalition. The costs are a worse policy in event E and a worse policy
in expectation and higher perks in event ¬E. Therefore we can infer that strategic
voting will only occur if the perks associated with a grand coalition are large and the
probability of the extreme party entering parliament is high.
Let us now turn to the question whether deviations (2) and (3) can dominate deviation
(1). A comparison of (1) and (2) according to the descriptions given in the list above
reveals that the policy outcome would be no diﬀerent. The only diﬀerence is with
perks. As deviation (2) yields a larger number of governmental seats and thus larger
amounts of perks in any of the possible cases, it is strictly dominated by deviation
(1). The result of a comparison between (1) and (3) is not so clear. There may be
parameter constellations of a kind making deviation (3) favorable. These are however
rather special cases.9 Accordingly, we concentrate on strategic voting according to
deviation (1) in the remainder of the paper.
In equilibrium we obtain
Proposition 1
(i) If p is small, then there exists a unique equilibrium of the political process with






E if δi = −1,
R if δi = 1,yi > ym,
L if δi = 1,yi < ym,
L or R if δi = 1,yi = ym.
2. If E does not enter, L and R have a chance of 1
2 to form the government.











































E if δi = −1
R if δi = 1,yi > ˆ yj,
L if δi = 1,yi < ˆ yj,
j if δi = 1,yi = ˆ yj,
where j is either L or R.
2. Party j will form a single-party government independently of whether the































E if δi = −1,
R if δi = 1,yi > ˆ yl,
L if δi = 1,yi < ˆ yl,
l if δi = 1,yi = ˆ yl,
l ∈ {R,L}, i.e. l can be both L and R.
2. Party l will form a single-party government independently of whether the

























The precise threshold values for p distinguishing the three cases in Proposition 1 are
given in the extended version of this proposition in Appendix A. There we also provide
a formal proof of the proposition. Here we give an intuitive explanation.
According to the intuition of the strategic voter’s trade-oﬀ given above, the beneﬁts of
strategic voting accrue in event E when the formation of a grand coalition is avoided.
In event ¬E, strategic voting bears utility losses relative to sincere voting. Hence if
the probability p for event E to occur is low, the probability of reaping the beneﬁts of
strategic voting is low but the complementary probability 1 − p of realizing the costs
is high. Thus strategic voting is unattractive and will not occur in equilibrium for low
probabilities of party E entering parliament. In such cases, both conventional parties
receive the same share of votes. A grand coalition forms in event E and a single-party
government by either L or R with a minimal majority of seats comes about in event
¬E.
For higher values of p, strategic voting becomes attractive. Note that the preferences of
voters are symmetric in the sense that half of the electorate would prefer either of the
conventional parties if they voted sincerely, but in general utility derived from policies is
not symmetric.10 Therefore it is possible that, for a given probability p, all individuals
10As an example, consider two individuals characterized by incomes yl and yr that have the same
relative position to the median income, i.e. yl/ym = ym/yr. Our model does not possess the feature
that both individuals enjoy the same level of utility from the median voter’s most-preferred policy
(tym,gym).
16in the set [ym, ˆ yL] prefer to vote strategically. But this is not the case for all individuals
in the set [ˆ yR,ym] and vice versa. As a consequence, at an intermediate level of p a
coordination of voters can occur only in the direction of one of the two conventional
parties. In both events E and ¬E, this results in a single-party government formed by
the party that the strategic voters have coordinated on. In event E, the government
possesses a minimal majority of seats, whereas in event ¬E it occupies a supermajority
of seats.
In the third case distinguished in the proposition where p is high, coordination on any
of the two conventional parties is an equilibrium. The outcome is essentially the same
as in the case of an intermediate level of p, except that now there are subsets of voters
on both sides of the political spectrum that have an incentive to vote strategically.
5 Tax Contracts
We now allow parties to sign tax contracts in which a party k restricts its tax policy to
an interval τk = [tC
k ,¯ tC
k ] before the election takes place. We solve the political process
by backward induction. Voters take optimal voting decisions, and conventional par-
ties oﬀer optimally chosen tax contracts anticipating voting decisions and government
formation.
5.1 Preliminary analysis
Again we are looking for subgame-perfect equilibria that are coalition-proof among
conventional voters. As preliminary steps for this analysis we establish the following
results:
Lemma 3
Suppose that party k can form the government and has signed the tax contract τk.
1. If t∗
k ∈ τk, party k chooses t∗
k.
2. If ¯ tC
k < t∗




k, party k chooses tC
k .
Lemma 3 says that a party that is the sole party in power will always implement its
most-preferred tax rate given this is allowed by its tax contract. If its most-preferred
17tax rate is not included in the tax contract, then the party will choose the boundary
of its tax contract that is closest to its ideal tax rate.
Without tax contracts voters can be unambiguously attributed to preferring a certain
party. That is, for any given amount of governmental seats, individual i will prefer
party k to party j. In general, this is not possible in the setting with tax contracts.
As the parties ﬁx a tax rate they will implement once in oﬃce, it depends on the
election outcome how much is spent on the public good and how much on perks.
Accordingly, their preferences depend on their (rational) expectations about the result
of the election. We adopt the following deﬁnition of sincere voting when tax contracts
are oﬀered:
Deﬁnition 1 (sincere voting)
A voter votes sincerely if he votes for the party whose policy he likes best given that
both conventional parties receive the same number of seats.
The assumption that not all voters will behave as strategic players in the usual game-
theoretic sense appears to be very realistic and has a long tradition in the literature.
The most prominent line is Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996), McKelvey
and Ordeshook (1987), and Ortin and Schultz (2005). Using sincere voting in our
model makes it easy to construct the equilibria in which some voters vote strategically.
However, as we will discuss at the end of this section, we could dispense with the
above deﬁnition and assume that all conventional voters will correctly predict the
election outcome and vote accordingly. Additionally, our equilibria with and without
tax contracts would not change if all conventional voters voted entirely strategically.
In the next step we examine what is the median voter’s most preferred tax rate under
sincere voting. We use
g(t,sk) :=
tY − (1 + λ)skb
(1 + λ)c
(9)
to denote the level of public goods party k chooses if it forms a government with sk
seats and is committed to a tax rate t. Similarly, g(t,sL + sR) is the level of public
goods parties L and R choose if they form a coalition government with sL + sR seats
and are committed to a tax rate t.
Under sincere voting, two situations can occur if the extreme party enters parliament.
First, the conventional parties’ tax contracts overlap and a grand coalition accedes to
power with S − sE seats. Second, the tax contracts do not overlap, and there will be
a caretaker government. If the parties’ tax sets are not disjunct, the median voter’s
18preferred (second-best) policy11 is the solution of the following problem:
max
t E[Uym] = p(Alng(t,S − sE) + (1 − t)ym) + (1 − p)(Alng(t,S/2) + (1 − t)ym).
We obtain
Lemma 4
There exists a unique tax rate tym(S/2,S − sE) that maximizes the median voter’s
expected utility under sincere voting if tym(S/2,S − sE) is in the intersection of the











The proof is obvious. As g(t,S − sE) and g(t,S/2) are strictly increasing in t, the
left-hand side of (10) is strictly decreasing in t. Hence there is unique tym(S/2,S−sE),
which can be determined by solving (10) for t.
Now we turn to the situation where the conventional parties’ tax sets do not intersect.
In this case there will be a caretaker government in event E whose value to the median
voter is independent of the parties’ tax-contract choices, so the problem of ﬁnding the
optimal tax rate boils down to
max
t
E[Uym] = (1 − p)(Alng(t,S/2) + (1 − t)ym).










where ct stands for caretaker government.
In general, the tax rates tym(S/2,S−sE) and tym(S/2,ct) are diﬀerent. We next observe
that τL = τR = tym(S/2,S−sE) cannot be an equilibrium. Each party has an incentive
to deviate because by choosing a tax rate closer to tym(S/2,ct), it can win more votes
under sincere voting. Consequently, if a subset of voters coordinates on one party to
avoid a caretaker government, it will be the one that deviated due to the minimal
strategic voters reﬁnement. Hence, the two conventional parties signing a tax contract
with tym(S/2,S − sE) cannot be an equilibrium. By contrast, the two conventional
parties choosing tym(S/2,ct) is an equilibrium, as stated in the next proposition. To
simplify notation we abbreviate tym(S/2,ct) by tym in the following.
11Recall that perks cannot be avoided.
195.2 Equilibria with tax contracts






















The following equilibria exist:
(i) If p ≤ ˆ p,






R yi > ym,
L yi < ym,
R or L yi = ym.
3. If E does not enter, each conventional party will win the election with prob-
ability 1
2, form the government, and choose gk(tym, S
2). If E does enter, both
conventional parties form a grand coalition and choose gk(tym,S − sE).
(ii) For all p > ˆ p,





R yi > ˆ yL,
L yi ≤ ˆ yL.
Party L forms the government independently of whether E enters. Party
L chooses gL(tym, S
2) if E does enter and gL(tym, S2






R yi ≥ ˆ yR,
L yi < ˆ yR.
20Party R forms the government independently of whether E enters.
Party R chooses gR(tym, S
2) if E enters parliament and gR(tym, S2
2(S−sE))
if E does not enter.
The main conclusions from Proposition 2 are that strategic voting to avoid a grand
coalition occurs when p is larger than a certain threshold, and that tax contracts yield
moderate policy outcomes. That is, the conventional parties will commit themselves to
a tax rate close to the one preferred by the median voter and, as perks are restricted by
(S −sE)b, the amount of public good provision cannot be extremely low or excessively
high. However, recall from section 5.1 that the policy outcome in event E with tax
contracts is not the policy most preferred by the median voter. In the next section
we will provide detailed intuitive explanations for Proposition 2 by comparing the
policy outcomes of the political process with and without tax contracts in societies
that exhibit diﬀerent degrees of political polarization. First however, it is useful to
note the following corollary:
Corollary 1
The equilibria in Proposition 2 remain the same if all voters correctly predict the
election outcome.
Corollary 1 follows from the proof of Proposition 2. Given that the parties oﬀer τL =
τR = {tym} and given e.g. the voting decisions of voters in [ˆ yL,ym] in the case of (ii)
2.(a), it is optimal for voters in [ymin, ˆ yL) to vote for party L and voters in (ym,ymax] to
support R. Next to voting behavior on the basis of τL = τR = {tym}, the crucial issue
is whether parties gain an incentive to deviate from tym once all voters possess correct
expectations of the voting outcome. To show that this is not the case, the reasoning
in the proof of Proposition 2 can be readily applied as long as the deviating party
loses vote shares. The latter must be the case for the following reason: First, holding
perks ﬁxed, the policy of the deviating party attracts fewer voters. Since it attracts
fewer voters, the perks may decline, which acts to increase the vote share. However,
this (positive) eﬀect on vote share from lower perks can never outweigh the (negative)
eﬀect on vote shares from the deviation in policy (i.e. tax rates). Our deﬁnition of
sincere voting neglects this ‘perks eﬀect’. However the proof of Proposition 2 still holds
true if voters have correct expectations, as the neglected perks eﬀect is dominated by
21the ‘policy eﬀect’ on vote shares.
6 Eﬀects of Tax Contracts
Tax contracts have two eﬀects on policy outcomes. First, tax contracts keep policies
moderate, and second, they help to avoid the large amounts of perks associated with
grand coalitions. The ﬁrst eﬀect follows directly from Proposition 2. In this section
we explain why grand coalitions are less likely to occur in a regime with tax contracts
than in a regime without tax contracts.
We start by deﬁning the degree of political polarization as the distance between the
two conventional parties’ platforms:
Deﬁnition 2
∆y = yR − yL
When varying the degree of political polarization, we keep the symmetry assumption,
i.e. the median voter will receive the same utility from both parties’ preferred policies.
If, in the regime with tax contracts, the probability of the extreme party entering
parliament is higher than ˆ p, then a subset of voters will deviate from sincere voting
to reduce the perks associated with a grand coalition. In the next lemma we state
that this already happens if the probability of the extreme party becoming part of the
parliament is smaller than 1
2.
Lemma 5
ˆ p < 1
2.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Without tax contracts, the costs of a deviation from sincere voting in terms of public-
good policy clearly depend on the political polarization of the society. It is interesting
to ask how the two regimes – with and without tax contracts – compare with respect
to preventing a grand coalition by strategic voting. Without tax contracts, this will
happen if p is not too small. The critical threshold is denoted by pnc such that grand
coaltions are avoided if p > pnc. The formal derivation of pnc can be found in Appendix
A (Equation (24) and Proposition 1 (Extended Version)). We obtain
Proposition 3
For all degrees of political polarization, ˆ p < pnc.
22A formal proof is given in Appendix B. Proposition 3 says that for all probabilities
p for which grand coalitions are avoided by strategic voting in the regime without
tax contracts, they will also be avoided in the regime with tax contracts. Moreover,
there is a set of p values for which strategic voting occurs with tax contracts but not
without tax contracts. In these situations tax contracts reduce the perks enjoyed by
the government.
To sharpen the intuition, we consider the case without political polarization, i.e. where
both parties have the median voter’s utility as their political platform. Then the only
diﬀerence between a regime with and without tax contracts is the way in which the
additional seats of supermajorities are ﬁnanced. Recall that in both regimes superma-
jorities occur with sincere voting in event E and with strategic voting in event ¬E. To
switch to strategic voting means to exchange a large supermajority with probability p
and minimal majority governments with probability 1 − p for a smaller supermajority
with probability 1 − p and a minimal majority with probability p.
In the regime without tax contracts, an additional governmental seat is ﬁnanced by a
tax increase that involves constant marginal utility losses for the voters. A tax increase
in the event of the extreme party entering parliament is not possible in the regime with
tax contracts, and additional governmental seats are ﬁnanced by lower public good
provision. Due to the strict concavity of voters’ utility from the public good, the
marginal utility loss of an additional seat increases with the size of the supermajority.
Due to the increasing marginal utility losses of ﬁnancing additional perks via cuts in
public good provision, the relative beneﬁt from having a smaller supermajority is larger
in the regime with tax contracts. Therefore the critical probability of switching from
sincere voting to strategic voting is lower in the tax-contract regime than in the regime
without tax contracts.
In addition, when there is political polarization, the attractiveness of voting strategi-
cally declines in the regime without tax contracts. The reason is that in order to avoid
the perks associated with a grand coalition, the set of strategic voters also incurs the
cost of a less favorable policy pursued by the party on the other side of the political
spectrum. In this way, the weight attached to the utility gain from avoiding a grand
coalition, p, must be higher for strategic voting to occur. In fact, the costs for the
strategic voters increases with the degree of political polarization. Therefore the criti-
cal probability pnc for strategic voting in the regime without tax contracts is higher, the
more polarized the society is. By contrast, the critical probability for strategic voting
23in the regime with tax contracts is not aﬀected by the level of political polarization,
as parties commit themselves to moderate tax rates. Hence, the cost incurred by the
strategic voters in terms of less favorable policies is absent with tax contracts. In this
way, the eﬀect of tax contracts on avoiding large amounts of perks in grand coalitions
is particularly signiﬁcant in polarized societies.
7 Welfare of the Median Voter
In this section we examine how the welfare of the median voter is aﬀected by the
introduction of tax contracts. In particular, we are interested in how tax contracts
impact on taxes, public good provision, and perks, and how this is evaluated by the
median voter. According to the results in the previous section, we have to distinguish
three cases with respect to the probability of the extreme party entering parliament.
• p ≤ ˆ p: sincere voting equilibrium occurs in both regimes – with and without tax
contracts.
• ˆ p < p < pnc: strategic voting to avoid a grand coalition occurs only in the regime
with tax contracts but not in the regime without tax contracts.
• p > pnc: strategic voting occurs with and without tax contracts.
We summarize the main insights in the next proposition:
Proposition 4
Case 1: p ≤ ˆ p: The median voter beneﬁts from tax contracts if polarization
is high. The opposite is the case for very low levels of polarization.
Case 2: ˆ p < p < pnc: The median voter beneﬁts from tax contracts if polar-
ization is high. He may also beneﬁt if the level of polarization is low.
Case 3: p > pnc: The median voter beneﬁts from tax contracts if polarization
is high. The opposite is the case for very low levels of polarization.
The following reasoning establishes the proof of the proposition. Consider the ﬁrst
case where p < ˆ p. The condition that tax contracts yield higher welfare for the median
voter is




[(Uym(tL(S/2),S/2) + Uym(tR(S/2),S/2))] + p Uym(tRL(S − sE),S − sE).
(13)
Uy(t,s) represents the utility a conventional voter (δ = 0) with income y derives from
a policy characterized by a tax rate t and implemented by a government with s seats.12
In condition (13) we explicitly write the tax rates in the regime without tax contracts as
functions of the number of governmental seats. tk(sk) and tLR(sL +sR) are deﬁned by
(4) and (7), respectively. By contrast, the equilibrium tax rate tym in the regime with
tax contracts as characterized in (11) does not react to diﬀerent sizes of the government.
Condition (13) expresses the utility of the median voter with tax contracts on the
left-hand side and without tax contracts on the right-hand side. For the following
arguments it is convenient to rewrite (13) in the following way:
(1 − p)[Uym(tym,S/2) − 1/2(Uym(tL(S/2),S/2) + Uym(tR(S/2),S/2))]
> p[Uym(tRL(S − sE),S − sE) − Uym(tym,S − sE)]
(14)
Now, the left-hand side represents the utility diﬀerence between the regimes with and
without tax contracts in event ¬E and the right-hand side the utility diﬀerence in event
E. We note again that tym represents the most-preferred tax rate of the median voter
in the case of a minimal majority. However, in case of a supermajority he would prefer
higher taxes. Hence, if the tax rate tRL of the grand coalition without tax contracts is
not too far from the median voter’s most-preferred tax rate in the case of a government
with S −sE seats, the right-hand side of (14) is clearly positive. As already indicated,
this reﬂects the fact that the median voter prefers to ﬁnance the supermajority of the
grand coalition via tax increases rather than cuts in public good provision. In event
¬E, which is represented on the left-hand side of the equation, there will be minimal
winning coalitions of single-party governments. The left-hand side is positive since (1)
the outcome under tax contracts reﬂects the median voter’s most-preferred policy, and
(2) the voters’ utilities are concave, so the convex combination of two policies yields
lower utility than the voters’ most-preferred policy. Although the left-hand side of (14)
is always positive, it is zero if there is no political polarization, i.e. if party L and party
R both have the median voter as their platform voter. Moreover, in this case the right-
12Note that the tax rate and the number of seats of the government (t,s) are suﬃcient to characterize
the policy with respect to public good provision via the budget constraint, as each seat carries perks
b with it.
25hand side becomes positive. Consequently, we can infer that with very low levels of
polarization the regime without tax contracts gives higher utility for the median voter
than the regime with tax contracts. This changes when the degree of polarization
becomes suﬃciently large. Then the left-hand side is highly positive, compensating for
a potentially positive right-hand side of condition (14). This is due to the moderating
eﬀect of tax contracts on policy.
In the case where ˆ p < p < pnc, tax contracts may yield higher welfare than the regime
without tax contracts, even in societies with a low degree of polarization. The reason
is that tax contracts not only lead to moderate tax rates, they also lower perks by
avoiding a grand coalition in event E. The condition for tax contracts to be favorable









> p[Uym(tRL(S − sE),S − sE) − Uym(tym,S/2)].
(15)
Now, the right-hand side is strictly negative as the grand coalition is avoided in the
regime with tax contracts but not in the one without tax contracts. However, there is
a utility loss associated with strategic voting in event ¬E, due to the supermajority of
the single-party government. Consequently, for small degrees of polarization, the left-
hand side becomes negative as well. However, condition (15) may still hold meaning
that tax contracts are also favorable with low polarization.
Finally, when p is large, we again obtain a situation where tax contracts are welfare-
improving for the median voter if the society is polarized but are less favorable for very
low degrees of polarization. In this case, the regime with tax contracts is preferred to


















> p[Uym(tRL(S − sE),S/2) − Uym(tym,S/2)]
(16)
Again we see that the median voter prefers supermajorities to be ﬁnanced by a tax
increase rather than a decrease in the provision of the public good. Consequently, for
small degrees of polarization the left-hand side can be negative, whereas the right-
hand side is close to zero. However, for a suﬃciently high degree of polarization, the
political costs of strategic voting in the regime without tax contracts become large,
and the moderating eﬀect of tax contracts is dominant.
26We might conclude from this discussion that it would be useful to consider an extended
framework for the introduction of tax contracts. For instance, if voters could decide
on election day whether they would like the tax contracts to be enforced, tax contracts
would only be introduced if they are supported by the median voter. This would occur
in highly polarized societies.
8 Extensions
An important assumption of our model is that the number of seats in a grand coalition
is larger than the number of seats in a single-party government if voters coordinate on
one party and the extreme party does not enter parliament. As there are ﬁxed perks
per member of parliament, a grand coalition is always more expensive for the voters
than a single-party government.
Alternatively, one could make the following assumption: A single-party government
involves a ﬁxed amount of perks of Psg, whereas a grand coalition takes an amount Pgc
of perks with Pgc > Psg. With this assumption, the results would diﬀer slightly. With-
out tax contracts, the results remain the same if perks are adjusted correspondingly.
However, with tax contracts the voters always coordinate on a single-party govern-
ment. The diﬀerence to this paper’s assumption is that single-party governments are
now equally expensive with respect to perks, i.e. there is no diﬀerence between a
single-party government with S/2 seats and one with S2/2(S − sE) seats. In this way,
tax contracts would always prevent a grand coalition, whereas without tax contracts
this would only be the case in a society with suﬃciently low polarization or a suﬃ-
ciently high probability p of the extreme party entering parliament. Hence choosing
this alternative formulation would reinforce our main results.
9 Conclusion
We have examined a novel institution called tax contracts and ﬁnd that, particularly
in polarized societies, it exhibits socially desirable properties. In addition, allowing
parties to make binding tax promises may have further advantages. It gives parties
access to political leadership that can be trusted to fulﬁll their promises and to provide
public services. While such leadership can be gained by maintaining a reputation for
appropriately rewarding agents and citizens (Myerson, 2008) in a society, tax contracts
27could function as a complementary measure.
28Appendix
A Formal Details on Strategic Voting Without Tax
Contracts
In this section we formally depict the trade-oﬀ of strategic voters between avoiding
large amounts of perks associated with a grand coalition and the expense of a less
desirable policy. Then we argue that only deviation (1) of the three possible deviations
from sincere voting given in section 4.2 is of interest for the paper. Finally, we give a
formal version of Proposition 1.
To formally depict the trade-oﬀ that strategic voters face, we can write the tax rate of
























This notation separates the share of the tax rate that ﬁnances the perks for a super-
majority government from the tax rate of this party if it were to form a single-party
government with a minimal majority of seats. (17) can also be written as



































The diﬀerence in a voter i’s utility from the policies of two diﬀerent parties j and k
can then be expressed in the following way:






























Equation (18) reveals that utility diﬀerences can be separated into two parts: the
diﬀerence in the political orientation of parties k and j and the diﬀerent sizes of super-
majorities in the legislature. Note that a party’s public good provision is unaﬀected
by the number of governmental seats. The latter merely determine how expensive the
29respective level of public good provision will be. Accordingly, (18) illustrates that a
voter preferring the political orientation of party k may trade oﬀ a better policy with
respect to public good provision, which is more expensive due to a large supermajority,
for a worse public good policy that is cheaper. For this reason, a subset of voters could
decide to vote strategically for L, although when voting sincerely they would support
R, and vice versa.
A necessary condition for the respective subset to deviate from sincere voting is that
the outmost members of the sets, the voters characterized by ˆ yL and ˆ yR, will vote
strategically. Thus, coordination on L is possible if and only if
1 − p
2
[Uˆ yL(tR,S/2) + Uˆ yL(tL,S/2)] + p[Uˆ yL(tRL,S − sE)]
< (1 − p)Uˆ yL(tL,
S2
2(S − sE)
) + pUˆ yL(tL,S/2).
According to the previous notation, this condition can be rewritten to directly illustrate





R − tR(S/2)ˆ yi − (Alng
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The left-hand side of the inequality reﬂects the utility loss of voting strategically for
the less-preferred party. With respect to ˆ yL, this is the utility loss from having L’s
preferred level of public good provision in both events, E and ¬E. The right-hand side
represents the utility gain from lower perks. For ˆ yL we can write
1 − p
2














The condition for subset [ˆ yR,ym] to deviate from sincere voting is
1 − p
2














In a next step, we will examine possible motives for deviations from sincere voting
according to items (2) and (3) of the list in section 4.2. We start with deviation (2),
30i.e. subset [ym, ˜ yk] with measure greater than [ym, ˆ yk] votes strategically. In this case
party k forms a single-party government in events E and ¬E. Without loss of generality,
we let k = L. We can write the participation constraint for voter ˜ yL as follows:
1 − p
2






p(S/2 − sE) − [(1 − p)(s
¬E








k denote the number of seats of party k in events E and ¬E, respec-
tively. Further, we have s¬E




L − S/2 > 0.
If we compare deviation (2) with deviation (1) using equations (19) and (21), we
observe that voter ˜ yL would enjoy the same utility from public good provision with
both deviations. However, the reduction in perks from avoiding a grand coalition in
event E is smaller with deviation (2) than with deviation (1). In this sense the set
[ˆ yk, ˜ yk] has an incentive to return to sincere voting. Hence we conclude that deviation
(2) would not occur in equilibrium.
This may be diﬀerent for deviation (3). Here the subset of strategic voters [ym, ˜ yk] is
smaller than [ym, ˆ yk], which implies that in event E a grand coalition will be formed.
Consider now the participation constraint of voter ˜ yk.
1−p
2 [U˜ yk(tj,S/2) + U˜ yk(tk,S/2)] + p[Aln[ 2AY
c(1+λ)(yk+yj)] −
2A˜ yk



















The trade-oﬀ for voter ˜ yk is to accept a single-party government formed by his less-
preferred party with a supermajority of seats for a better policy with respect to public
good provision of a grand coalition in event E. This trade-oﬀ can be illustrated by
rewriting condition (22) as follows:
1 − p
2





























The left-hand side of (23) reﬂects the expected loss of a less desirable policy with
31respect to public good provision in ¬E, as well as the amount of additional perks
for the supermajority of the single-party government of k. On the right-hand side is
the expected utility gain from party k having greater weight in coalition bargaining.
Two points are worth mentioning. For this deviation to be proﬁtable for the critical
voter, his income ˜ yk must be in (ym,
yk+yj
2 ). Accordingly, the changes in the policy
of a grand coalition due to the additional vote share (ym, ˜ yk] are not very high. By
contrast, depending on the polarization of society, the policy change in ¬E may be
strong, as party k can now form a single-party government implementing its preferred
policy. Additionally, party k possesses a supermajority involving higher perks than
with sincere voting. Taken together, it seems that deviation (3) is favorable in those
rather special cases where e.g. p is very high.13 Thus we retain the focus of the paper
on deviation (1) rather than on deviation (3). In principle, we could just neglect a
possible equilibrium that is supported by this type of deviation from sincere voting.
To establish a clear formal basis for the analysis we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2
There does not exist a ˜ yk where k ∈ {R,L} and |[ym, ˜ yk]| < |[ym, ˆ yk]| such that (23)
holds.
We now obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 6
Given assumption 2,
(i) if p is suﬃciently small, no subset of voters will vote strategically,
(ii) if [Uˆ yL(tRL,S/2) − Uˆ yL(tL,S/2)] <
ˆ yL
Y (1 + λ)b(S/2 − sE), there exists a unique
pnc
L ∈ (0,1) such that for all p ≤ pnc
L the subset of voters [ym, ˆ yL] does not
deviate from sincere voting and for p > pnc
L the subset of voters [ym, ˆ yL] may vote
strategically,
(iii) if [Uˆ yR(tRL,S/2) − Uˆ yR(tR,S/2)] <
ˆ yR
Y (1 + λ)b(S/2 − sE), there exists a unique
pnc
R ∈ (0,1) such that for all p ≤ pnc
R the subset of voters [ˆ yR,ym] does not
deviate from sincere voting and for p > pnc
R the subset of voters [ˆ yR,ym] may vote
strategically.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
13More precisely, deviation (3) is favorable if (23) holds.
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Proposition 1 (Extended Version)





E if δi = −1
R if δi = 1,yi > ym
L if δi = 1,yi < ym
L or R if δi = 1,yi = ym
2. If E does not enter, L and R have a chance of 1
2 to form the government. If





































(ii) If pnc < p ≤ pnc





E if δi = −1
R if δi = 1,yi > ˆ yj
L if δi = 1,yi < ˆ yj
j if δi = 1,yi = ˆ yj
332. Party j will form a single-party government independently of whether the































E if δi = −1
R if δi = 1,yi > ˆ yl
L if δi = 1,yi < ˆ yl
l if δi = 1,yi = ˆ yl
l ∈ {R,L}.
2. Party l will form a single-party government independently of whether the

























The proof is given in Appendix B.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3
The ﬁrst point is obvious, as t∗
k is the utility-maximizing tax rate.
The second and third point follow from the single-peakedness of the parties’ preferences,
i.e. the strict concavity of Uk(t) = Aln(
tY −(1+λ)skb
(1+λ)c ) − tyk + 2θsk
√
b. The second





tY − (1 + λ)skb
 2
< 0.
34Proof of Lemma 5
By using (9), we can write g(t,sk) = g(t,S/2) − b
c(sk − S/2). Inserting into (12), we



























Multiplying both the denominator and the numerator by (−1) and applying some

















We will now show that
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which directly implies that ˆ p must be smaller than 0.5.









This inequality is equivalent to the grand coalition occupying more seats than a single-
party government with S2
2(S−sE) seats. We know from Lemma 2 that this is the case, as
long as sE < 1 −
√
8
4 , i.e. as long as Assumption 1 holds.
Proof of Lemma 6
(i) follows directly from
1
2




















(ii) We rewrite (19) as
1 − p
2



















From (i) we know that for p suﬃciently small, (27) is violated. The condition
[Uˆ yL(tRL,S/2) − Uˆ yL(tL,S/2)] <
ˆ yL
Y
(1 + λ)b(S/2 − sE)
implies that (27) is satisﬁed for p = 1. As the left-hand side of (27) is either strictly
increasing or strictly decreasing with p, we infer that in the case where [Uˆ yL(tRL,S/2)−
Uˆ yL(tL,S/2)] <
ˆ yL
Y (1 + λ)b(S/2 − sE) holds, it must be increasing with p. Then there
is a unique pnc
L where (27), and hence (19), holds with equality.
(iii) The proof of part (iii) follows the same line of argument as that of (ii) but using
the condition [Uˆ yR(tRL,S/2) − Uˆ yR(tR,S/2)] <
ˆ yR
Y (1 + λ)b(S/2 − sE) and (20) instead
of (19).
Proof of Proposition 1 (Extended Version)
Step 1. By construction, the combination of strategies constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium, as parties respond optimally to the election outcome. Citizens vote ac-
cording to their preferences.
Step 2.
Consider ﬁrst situation (i), where p < pnc.
We know from Lemma 6 that neither subset of voters [ym, ˆ yk], k ∈ {R,L}, has an
incentive to deviate from sincere voting. Hence the equilibrium exists. It is unique, as
any other candidate equilibrium must involve strategic voting. However, according to
Lemma 6 there is no incentive to do so.
36(ii) pnc < p ≤ pnc
h .
In this case, only the voters in set [ym, ˆ yj] have an incentive to deviate from sincere
voting but not the voters in set [ym, ˆ yk], as given in Lemma 6. Therefore we have an
equilibrium where a subset of voters of measure |[ym, ˆ yj]| will coordinate on party j.
It is generally not unique, as there may be many sets of measure |[ym, ˆ yj]|, including
voters that have an incentive to vote strategically for j.
(iii) pnc
h < p.
If p is suﬃciently large, both subsets of voters [ym, ˆ yk], k ∈ {R,L}, have an incentive
to vote strategically. Accordingly, there exist two types of equilibria, one in which
a measure of voters |[ym, ˆ yR]| votes strategically for party R, and another where a
measure |[ym, ˆ yL]| of voters votes strategically for party L. The equilibria given in the
proposition are special cases of these equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider case (i). I.e. p ≤ ˆ p
Step 1. We examine whether the subset of voters [ym, ˆ yj], j ∈ {L,R} can improve their
utility by voting strategically, given that τL = τR = {tym}. When the subset [ym, ˆ yj]
votes strategically, the expected utility of a voter with income ˆ yj is given by
U
d






















+ (1 − tym)ˆ yj
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ˆ yj = p(Aln(g(tym,S − sE)) + (1 − tym)ˆ yj) + (1 − p)(Aln(g(tym,S/2)) + (1 − tym)ˆ yj).
The condition Ud
ˆ yj ≤ Uo


















  = ˆ p
37Note that this condition is the same for ˆ yL and ˆ yR, as the tax rate does not diﬀer in
the cases with and without strategic voting and the valuation of the public is identical
across agents. Hence, in the equilibria with tax contracts there is only one probability
threshold for both critical voters ˆ yL and ˆ yR.
Step 2.
We next examine whether parties might deviate in stage 1 of the political game by
oﬀering diﬀerent tax contracts. In general, we proceed in the following way: For each
possible deviation of a party, we have to consider how voting behavior changes and
what its implications are for government formation. With respect to voting behavior,
we ﬁrst determine the outcome under sincere voting and check whether subsets of voters
can improve by voting strategically. This enables us to determine voting behavior in
the case of a deviation from the equilibrium tax contracts, and we can compare the
deviating party’s utility with the utility it would obtain without the deviation.
Without loss of generality, assume that party R oﬀers τd
R = [td
R,¯ td
R]. (Note that τL =
{tym}.) We consider the following deviations:
(d1) td
R < tym and ¯ td
R = tym. That is, party R expands its set of tax rates toward its
ideal policy. With this deviation, R is still able to form a grand coalition with
policy (tym,S −sE) but can implement a policy closer to its ideal point if it were
the only party in government.
As R would implement a policy with tR < tm (e.g. (td
R,sR)) in a single-party
government, with sincere voting there exists a ˜ y > ym such that all voters with
income yi > ˜ y vote for R, while the other voters vote for L. This would yield a
grand coalition with policy (tym,S−sE) in event E and a single-party government
of L in event ¬E involving a policy (tym,S/2 + s+), where s+ is the number of
seats derived from the votes of [ym, ˜ y].
Subsets of voters could now decide to vote strategically in order to either reduce
the size of the single-party government of L in event ¬E or to prevent a grand
coalition in event E. In the ﬁrst case, all voters in [ym+ε, ˜ y], where ε is a positive
very small number, vote for R. This would yield the same utility to the voters
as in the case of sincere voting without the deviation of party R. According to
Step 1 of the proof, this utility level is higher for the critical voter ˆ yL than if a
subset [ym, ˆ yL] voted for L with the aim of preventing a grand coalition. Hence
38the subset of voters [ym + ε, ˜ y] would coordinate on R, and there would be no
subset of voters willing to prevent a grand coalition.
This change in voting behavior implies that the deviating party has no chance of
forming a single-party government in event ¬E and will realize the same utility
level from a grand coalition in event E. Thus party R would be worse oﬀ with
the deviation.
(d2) td
R < tym and ¯ td
R < tym. In this case, party R does not include tym in its tax set to
prevent a grand coalition. In a single-party government, R would choose (td
R,sR).
Note that we do not preclude td
R = ¯ td
R.
Under sincere voting, there will again exist a critical voter ˜ y > ym such that all
voters i with income yi > ˜ y vote for R, and the other voters vote for L. The
policy outcome would be a caretaker government in event E and a single-party
government of L in event ¬E with policy (tym,S/2 + s+).
Two improvements by strategic voting are conceivable. First, if a caretaker gov-
ernment yields suﬃciently low utility for the voters, they can avoid it by a subset
[˜ y, ˆ yk] coordinating on party k ∈ {R,L}. Due to the minimal strategic voting re-
ﬁnement, the party the voters coordinate on is L. A second situation arises when
the caretaker government would yield similar (but not higher) utility levels to a
grand coalition for the voters. Then, as with deviation (d1), the subset [ym+ε, ˜ y]
would coordinate on R in order to have a minimal majority of the single-party
government of L in event ¬E.
In both cases – a caretaker government involving very low utility to the voters
and a caretaker government yielding moderate utility levels – party R will have
no chance of coming into power. Hence deviation (d2) is not proﬁtable.
(d3) td
R ≥ tym and ¯ td
R > tym. For completeness, we add that a possible deviation by R
might also be to expand the set to include policies t farther away from its ideal
point or even to have only policies farther away from the ideal point without
including tym. By the same arguments as above, this deviation leaves R worse
oﬀ. We omit the details here.
Next we prove case (ii).
Step 1. For the subsets of voters [ym, ˆ yj], j ∈ {L,R} to vote strategically, we can infer
from step 1 of the proof of case (i) that Ud
ˆ yj > Uo
ˆ yj must hold. Accordingly, these voters
39have an incentive to deviate from sincere voting if p > ˆ p.
Step 2.
For case (ii) we consider the same deviations as in (i):
(d1) td
R < tym and ¯ td
R = tym.
As R would implement a policy with tR < tym in a single-party government, with
sincere voting there exists a ˜ y > ym such that all voters with income yi > ˜ y will
vote for R and the others for L. This would yield a grand coalition with policy
(tym,S−sE) in event E and a single-party government of L in event ¬E, involving
a policy (tym,S/2 + s+), where s+ is the number of seats derived from the votes
of [ym, ˜ y].
Subsets of voters could now decide to vote strategically in order to either reduce
the size of the single-party government of L in event ¬E, or to prevent a grand
coalition in event E. In the ﬁrst case, all voters in [ym + ε, ˜ y] vote for R. This
would yield the same utility to the voters as in the case of sincere voting without
the deviation of party R. According to Step 1 of case (ii), this utility level is lower
for the critical voter ˆ yL than when a subset [ym, ˆ yL] votes for L with the aim of
preventing a grand coalition. The subset of voters [˜ y, ˆ yL] would coordinate on L
due to the minimal set of strategic voters reﬁnement.
This change in voting behavior implies that the deviating party R has no chance
of forming a single-party government. Thus party R would be worse oﬀ with the
deviation.
(d2) td
R < tym and ¯ td
R < tym. In this case, party R does not include tym in its tax
set. Hence a grand coalition is not possible, and R would form a single-party
government with (td
R,sR). Again we do not preclude td
R = ¯ td
R.
Under sincere voting, there exists a critical voter ˜ y > ym such that all voters with
income yi > ˜ y vote for R and the other voters vote for L. The policy outcome
would be a caretaker government in event E and a single-party government of L
in event ¬E with policy (tym,S/2 + s+).
In case (ii), as long as the caretaker government does not involve a higher level
of utility than a grand coalition with (tym,S − sE), the subset of voters [˜ y, ˆ yL]
will vote strategically to have a single-party government of L in both events, E
and ¬E. Hence deviation (d2) is not proﬁtable for party R.
40(d3) td
R ≥ tym and ¯ td
R > tym. For completeness, we again note the other possible
deviations by R, but omit the details as the arguments are similar to those set
out above.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part (i), we show that without political
polarization ˆ p < pnc. In the second part (ii), we verify that pnc increases with the
degree of political polarization.
(i)
Using the deﬁnition as given by (24), pnc can be written as
p
nc =
0.5[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2) − Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)] +
ˆ yj






Y (1 + λ)b(S
2 − sE + S
2
sE
S−sE) − Uˆ yj(tkj,S/2) + 0.5[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2) + Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)]
.
(28)
Without political polarization, both conventional parties possess the same political
platform, so in terms of policy the costs of voting strategically are zero. With no

























































Note that 1 − b




2 − sE. As the function f(x) =
ln(1−γx)
x is strictly declining with x for the constant γ smaller than 1 and x ∈ (0,1/γ),






The proof that pnc increases with political polarization proceeds in two steps. First,
we prove that
dpnc
d∆y > 0 under the assumption that
d[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2) − Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)]
d∆y
> 0.
In the second step, we show that this assumption holds.




2[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2) − Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)] +
ˆ yj
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S−sE) − Uˆ yj(tkj,S/2) + 0.5[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2) + Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)]
.
(30)












where N and D denote the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in (30),
respectively.
We want to show that
dpnc











Note that for this transformation, we have assumed that
d[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2)−Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)]
d∆y > 0.














Note that the worst policy for ˆ yj is (tj,S/2). By the concavity of the utility function,







Hence we can state that
d(Uˆ yj(tkj,S/2) − 1




















From this it follows directly that







Since pnc must be smaller than 1, condition (31) is satisﬁed for all values of pnc, as long
as
d[Uˆ yj(tk,S/2)−Uˆ yj(tj,S/2)]
d∆y > 0. We will now show that this is the case.















We now examine how the utility diﬀerence changes when the degree of political polar-
ization ∆y increases marginally. As we require symmetry with respect to the median
voter’s utility from both parties’ preferred policies, we will formally take the total
derivative with respect to yj, where the term
dyk
dyj denotes the change in yk that is
necessary after marginally increasing yj in order to (re-)establish the symmetry of
platforms.
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Without loss of generality, consider the case j = R. For the utility diﬀerence to increase










(ˆ yR − yL) > 0. (32)
The ﬁrst summand is clearly positive. As
dyL
dyR < 0, the second summand is only positive
when ˆ yR < yL. Hence if ˆ yR < yL, the condition holds.
43Suppose now that this is not the case, i.e. ˆ yR > yL. According to the platform
symmetry assumption, if one of the platforms yk is given, the position of the other
platform is unambiguously determined by the equation given in footnote 5. In this





















(ˆ yR − yL) > 0.
As ym−yL > ˆ yR−yL, we can estimate the second term from below by canceling ym−yL




(ym − ˆ yR) > 0,
which is clearly positive.
Intuitively, this result follows from the strong concavity of the utility function and the
platform symmetry with respect to the median voter. More precisely, the argument is
that as the bliss point of the critical voter ˆ yR is politically to the left of the median
voter, the marginal increase of yR implies a higher utility loss than the corresponding
decrease of yL due to the concavity of the utility function. Hence, the utility diﬀerence
between the two extremes must increase.
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